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ABSTRACT
This paper documents the diverging trends in volatility of the growth rate of sales at the aggregate
and firm level. We establish that the upward trend in micro volatility is not simply driven by a
compositional bias in the sample studied. We argue that this new fact sheds some shadows on the
proposed explanations for the decline in aggregate volatility and that, given the symmetry of the
diverging trends at the micro and macro level, a common explanation is likely. We conclude by
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Abstract
This paper documents the diverging trends in volatility of the growth rate of sales at the
aggregate and ﬁrm level. We establish that the upward trend in micro volatility is not simply
driven by a compositional bias in the sample studied. We argue that this new fact sheds some
shadows on the proposed explanations for the decline in aggregate volatility and that, given
the symmetry of the diverging trends at the micro and macro level, a common explanation is
likely. We conclude by describing one such theory.
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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
The volatility of macroeconomic variables has received increasing interest in recent years. McConnell
and Perez-Quiros [2000] showed that the volatility of GDP has declined signiﬁcantly since the mid
1980’s. Blanchard and Simon [2002] established the presence of a downward trend in the volatility
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1analyzed the time series of 124 macro variables since 1960 and found that the decline in aggregate
volatility, beginning in 1984, is pervasive.
In an attempt to increase our understanding of volatility, this paper examines its evolution at
the micro level. Speciﬁcally, the volatility of growth rate of sales at the ﬁrm level is examined using
the COMPUSTAT data base, and compared to the aforementioned evolution of volatility at the
aggregate level. The main ﬁnding is that while the growth rate of aggregate sales has become more
stable, the growth rate of sales at the ﬁrm level has become more volatile. Put diﬀerently, volatility
at the aggregate and ﬁrm level have followed diverging trends.1
Several exercises are undertaken to verify the robustness of the upward trend in ﬁrm-level volatil-
ity. An important concern when using a sample of ﬁrms gathered from COMPUSTAT database to
establish ﬁrm-level facts is whether it is representative of ﬁrms in the US economy. In section 2.2,
we argue that the upward trend in volatility is not simply the result of changes in the composition
of the sample that are not reﬂected in the economy. This is done by showing that the upward trend
persists after removing the predictable eﬀe c to fa g ea n ds i z eo nt h eﬁrm-level volatility and after
including ﬁrm-level ﬁxed eﬀects. Section 2.3 addresses the evolution of ﬁrm-level volatility across
diﬀerent sectors and ﬁnds that most sectors exhibit the upward trend.
Having veriﬁed the robustness of the upward trend in ﬁrm-level volatility, focus is shifted to the
volatility at the aggregate level. We examine the volatility of aggregate sales in the COMPUSTAT
sample (our sample). The aggregate volatility of our sample exhibits a mild decline in comparison
to volatility of aggregate ﬁnal sales.2 To gain further insight into the “mechanical” determinants of
this pattern, a variance decomposition is undertaken. In addition, evolution of volatility for other
sub-samples of GDP, such as the sales at the sector level, is examined.
Section 4 brieﬂy addresses the cyclical patterns of volatility observing that both the aggregate
and ﬁrm-level volatility of sales (and sales per worker) are pro-cyclical, albeit the maximum cross
1There exists some prior evidence of increasing uncertainty in the ﬁrm’s economic environment. Comin [2000]
ﬁnds that the volatility of individual stock returns has increased (almost) monotonically since the 1950’s. Campbell
et al. [2001] ﬁn dt h es a m eu p w a r dt r e n di nﬁrm speciﬁc risk i.e. the cross-sectional dispersion of the the component
of returns that is orthogonal to the average return in the 4-digit sector. However, aggregate stock returns have
also become more volatile. The volatility of monthly aggregate stock returns in the US markets (measured by the
standard deviation of a ten year rolling window of returns) remained low between the end of WWII and 1968. It
then increased, reaching a high plateau, between 1968 and 1983. It declined over the next decade until 1993, after
which it restarted its increase reaching the high volatility levels of the 70’s.
2Aggregate Final Sales refers to Final Sales of Domestic Product, gathered from the Bureau of Economic Analysis
(BEA).
2correlation between aggregate volatility and output seems to take place with a longer lag than for
ﬁrm-level volatility.
We conclude the paper by using our empirical ﬁndings to evaluate the explanations proposed
to understand the decline in aggregate volatility. These explanations can be divided in two groups.
The ﬁrst group attempts to explain the decline in macro volatility through mechanisms that lead
to a decline in volatility at the ﬁrm level and then, trivially, aggregate up the micro trends. The
second group of explanations attempts to directly explain the decline in macro volatility. Both of
these approaches are unsatisfactory in the light of the facts presented in this paper. The ﬁrst is
at odds with the increase in micro volatility. The second, though not inconsistent, is insuﬃcient
to account per se for the upward trend in ﬁrm-speciﬁc uncertainty. To ﬁll this gap, we propose a
new explanation that simultaneously accounts for the opposite trends observed in micro and macro
volatility.
2 Firm-Level Volatility
Consider the time series for a random variable Xt. The volatility of Xt is deﬁned as the time-series
of standard deviations of ten-year rolling windows of Xt. Formally, we compute the time series for









where ¯ Xt is the average of Xt between t − 4a n dt +5 .
In order to examine volatility at the ﬁrm level, annual data on Net Sales is gathered for a sample
of ﬁrms extracted from COMPUSTAT, comprising of publicly traded companies between 1950 and
2002.3 The sample is restricted to companies that have non-zero values of Net Sales for any of the
years in the sample period. Both currently active as well as inactive companies are included in
the sample whereas international ﬁrms are eliminated.4 Also eliminated are companies that exhibit
3Standard & Poor’s COMPUSTAT North America is a database of ﬁnancial, statistical and market information
covering publicly traded companies in the U.S. and Canada. Net Sales is deﬁned as gross sales (the amount of actual
billings to customers for regular sales completed during the year) reduced by cash discounts, trade discounts, and
returned sales and allowances for which credit is given to customers.
4Sensitivity tests were performed by varying the characteristics of the ﬁrms included in the sample along the
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Figure 1: Volatility of the Growth Rate of Real Firm-Level Sales
gaps in annual data on Net Sales or that do not have eleven years of sales in sample. Total sales
by year for the remaining ﬁrms constitute, on average, 78% of GDP.
For every ﬁrm, the series σ(γsalesit)i sc o m p u t e d ,w h e r eγsalesit represents the growth rate of real
sales for the company, the deﬂator being the aggregate producer price index (PPI). These standard
deviations are then averaged across all the ﬁrms in a year to arrive at the average volatility for every
year.5 As illustrated in Figure 1, volatility at the ﬁrm level exhibits a signiﬁcant upward trend. In
order to build a more representative measure of volatility, they are weighed using the ﬁrm’s share
of sales in total sales in a given year. Figure 1 also shows the persistent upward trend after the use
of these weights.
T h es o u r c eo ft h i si n c r e a s ei nv o l a t i l i t y ,h o w e v e r ,m a yb es u b j e c tt oq u e s t i o n .W h i l et h eu p w a r d
vs. both active and inactive companies and (iii) including or excluding foreign companies. The results are consistent
across the combinations of sample characteristics.
5Another way of measuring the volatility inherent in the ﬁrm’s environment is by focusing on the cross-section as
Campbell et al. [2001]. Speciﬁcally, we could compute standard deviations of growth rates across all the ﬁrms in a
given year. We believe that the time series measure of volatility used in this paper is more appealing since it is less
likely to be aﬀected by compositional biases. When computing the standard deviation of the window in the time
series, we remove the average growth rate for the ﬁr mi nt h ew i n d o w ,a n di ne ﬀect control for ﬁrm speciﬁc aspects
that aﬀect the growth rate of sales. These aspects, however, potentially show up in the cross sectional measure and
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Figure 2: Comparison of Un-weighted Volatility in Full Sample and Manufacturing Sub-Sample.
trend may, as we claim, accurately reﬂect changes in the economy, the increase in volatility may
be a feature speciﬁc only to the sample or the variable in use. Our claims necessitate discrediting
these possibilities.
2.1 Bias Due to Price Divergence
The lack of price deﬂators at the ﬁrm level has, thus far, made impossible an analysis of the growth
rate of nominal sales in real terms. There exists then the possibility that the increase in volatility
may be driven by a divergence in the prices at the ﬁrm level.6 T oa d d r e s st h i si s s u e ,t w oe x e r c i s e s
are undertaken. First, a subset of our sample is created, comprising of all ﬁrms in the manufacturing
sector (sub-sample). For this sub-sample of ﬁrms, Net Sales are adjusted using deﬂators at the 4-
digit level.7 Figure 2 presents the average volatility of the growth rate of nominal and real ﬁrm-level
sales for both the full and the manufacturing sub-sample. Figure 3 reﬂects weighted measures for
t h es a m ev a r i a b l e .
Two conclusions are drawn from these ﬁgures. First, the evolution of the average volatility for
the growth rate of nominal sales for ﬁrms in the full sample and ﬁrms in the manufacturing sub-
6As will be evident in ﬁgure 2, CPI inﬂation plays no role in the volatility of the growth rate of nominal sales at
the ﬁrm level.
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Figure 3: Comparison of Weighted Volatility in Full Sample and in Manufacturing Sub-Sample.
sample, is similar. Second, in the manufacturing sector, the evolution of volatility for the growth
rate of nominal and real sales is the same.
While this result does not eliminate the possibility that the upward trend in volatility is driven
by ﬁrm-level price divergence, it suggests that the divergence operates, if at all, within 4-digit
sectors, a scenario we consider unlikely. However, to rule out this possibility, a more “real” measure
of input for the ﬁrm is examined in the form of employment.8 Figure 4 plots the evolution of the
weighted and un-weighted measures of volatility for the growth rate of employment at the ﬁrm-level.
The upward trends are evident.
2.2 Controlling for Changes in the Sample Composition
The sample used ranges from 1950 through 2002 and is extracted from the COMPUSTAT database.
The size of the sample increases drastically in the 1970’s raising the possibility that the upward
trend in the ﬁrm-level volatility is the result of a compositional bias. Firms that are incorporated
in the data set in the post-1970’s period are potentially more volatile than the ﬁrms in the pre-
70’s period either because the sector in which they operate is more volatile, or on account of ﬁrm
speciﬁc attributes such as being younger or smaller. In order to show that the upward trend in micro
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Figure 4: Volatility of Growth Rate of Number of Employees
volatility is not due to a compositional bias in the sample studied, three exercises are undertaken.9
First, the sample of ﬁrms is divided up at any point in time in to ﬁve quintiles according to
the level of sales to examine whether the increase in volatility is driven by any speciﬁc quintile or
whether it holds across the distribution. Comin and Mulani [2003] shows that the increase in ﬁrm-
level volatility is not conﬁned to any one section of the distribution but is rather pervasive across
the sample. This ﬁnding, though, does not necessarily negate the compositional bias argument. In
theory, given the higher probability of sampling smaller (and/or younger) ﬁrms in the post-1970
period, all the quintiles may be composed to a larger extent of smaller, more volatile ﬁrms.
Hence, as a second exercise, we focus our analysis on the component of volatility that is not
explained by ﬁrm-level characteristics that are changing in the sample. Speciﬁcally, we run a pooled
regression of the ﬁrm-level standard deviations (σit)o nav e c t o ro ft h eﬁrms characteristics (Xit)
that contains the log of the share of ﬁr ms a l e si nG D Pa n dt h el o go ft h eﬁrm’s age.
σit = α0 + α1 Xit + ²
σ
it (1)
The unpredictable component of volatility (²σ
it) is then aggregated, resulting in a time series for
ﬁrm-level volatility. As in the previous section, both weighted and un-weighted measures of residual
9An alternative approach is to track down the evolution of the volatility of the ﬁrms initially in sample but this
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Figure 5: Residual Volatility after Controlling for log(age) and log(size).
volatility are considered, where the weights are given by the ﬁrm’s share in total sales in the year.
Figure 5 plots the prominent upward trend in residual volatility, though there is a ﬂattening of the
trend during the 80’s and 90’s in the weighted measures.
The evidence presented thus far refutes the hypothesis that the observed upward trend in ﬁrm-
speciﬁc uncertainty is simply the result of the inclusion of a larger share of smaller or younger (more
volatile) ﬁrms in the sample since 1970. However, it may still be argued that factors other than size
or age induce higher volatility in the new population of ﬁrms sampled leading to a compositional
bias. To rule out this possibility, as a third exercise, ﬁrm dummies are used to eliminate the eﬀect of
ﬁrm speciﬁc variables (both observable and unobservable) on volatility. Removing this ﬁrm speciﬁc
component of volatility leaves only the component that is orthogonal to ﬁxed ﬁrm characteristics
and therefore immune to any compositional bias in the sample.10
Note that this exercise constitutes a stringent test of the upward trend in micro volatility hy-
pothesis. To illustrate this point, suppose that our hypothesis is true and the upward trend is
due to the fact that new ﬁrms in the economy are just more volatile. Removing the ﬁrm-speciﬁc
component of all the ﬁrms in sample eliminates the component that is more volatile for new ﬁrms
- the precise component we are looking to examine. Nevertheless, using a ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀect in the
regression is an informative exercise because if the upward trend still holds, a compositional bias
10One such bias is the associated with the change in the industry composition of the sample.
8can be ruled out as a driver of the upward trend.
Formally, we run the following regression where αi is a set of ﬁrm speciﬁc dummies and the set
of controls included in Xit contains the log of age and the log of the share of sales in GDP.
σit = αi + βXit + ²
σ
it
Figure 5 also plots the average residual volatility series (²σ
t ). Even after removing the ﬁrm speciﬁc
component in volatility, the upward trend persists.
2.3 Firm-level Volatility by Sectors
Having veriﬁed the robustness of the upward trend in volatility, we investigate whether the increase
in volatility is pervasive or whether instead it is limited to a few sectors. To address this question,
the following regressions are run for each two-digit sector:
σit = α + βXit + δDst + ²
σ
it
σit = αi + βXit + δDst + ²
σ
it,
where Dst is a set of sector speciﬁc time dummies. By running these regressions with and without
ﬁrm weights, we can construct the time series for the weighted and non-weighted average ﬁrm-level
volatility after controlling for the eﬀect of age and size and (possibly) for a ﬁrm-speciﬁc intercept
in volatility. For each two-digit sector Table 1 reports the average estimated coeﬃcient on the year
dummies for each decade from the regression with ﬁrm-level ﬁxed eﬀects. Table 1 shows that the
upward trend in ﬁrm-level volatility is pervasive across sectors with the exception of construction.
Results are very similar for the regressions without ﬁrm-speciﬁci n t e r c e p t s .
3 Aggregate Volatility
The evolution of volatility at the aggregate level does not mirror the upward trend in ﬁrm-level
volatility. Several authors have observed that a variety of macro variables have become more stable
o v e rt h es a m et i m ep e r i o d .F i g u r e6p l o t st h et i m es e r i e so fσ(.) for both the growth rate of nominal
and real aggregate ﬁnal sales from the BEA.
Several points are worth mentioning here. First, the growth rate of aggregate sales exhibits a





1 955 1 959 1 963 1 967 1 971 1 975 1 979 1 983 1 987 1 991 1 995
Nominal Aggregate Sales
Real Aggregate Sales (BEA)
Figure 6: Volatility of Growth Rate of Aggregate Final Sales (BEA)
Simon [2002] for GDP, the time series volatility of aggregate sales is best characterized by a secular
decline that started in the 1950’s and was interrupted from the mid 60’s through the 70’s. Finally,
given the similar downward trends in both nominal and real sales, inﬂation does not seem to be a
signiﬁcant issue.
When compared to volatility at the ﬁrm level (Figure 7), the secular diverging trends in the
post-war period are evident.11
To understand the mechanics of the divergence in the evolution of volatility we decompose the
variance of the aggregate growth rate of sales in the COMPUSTAT sample into a variance and a
covariance component.
3.1 Variance Decomposition
Before undertaking the variance decomposition, we verify that our sample exhibits similar charac-
teristics at the aggregate level as the aggregate ﬁnal sales. Figure 8 plots the volatility of the growth
rate of aggregate sales for the ﬁrms in the our sample. The downward trend in the volatility is not
as prominent as for the volatility of GDP. There are two reasons for this. First, the growth rate
11The divergence persists at higher frequencies as well. The correlation between ten year rolling windows extracted
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Figure 7: Volatility of Growth Rate of Aggregate Final Sales (BEA) and Firm-Level Sales
of total sales in the our sample varies as the comprehensiveness of the sample varies. Fluctuations
in the comprehensiveness of the sample accentuated by the addition of ﬁrms incorporated in the
NASDAQ will add noise to the growth rate of aggregate sales in the post 1970 period. This force
may tend to induce an upward bias in the trend of the volatility of the growth rate of total sales
in the sample. This problem is particularly important in the last observation where a signiﬁcant
reduction in the number of ﬁrms in the sample in 2002 results in a substantial decline in total sales.
This abnormally large negative growth rate causes the spike in the volatility for the last observation.
Second, our sample is substantially smaller than the US economy. As we move to lower levels of
aggregation in the US economy, levels that better represent the size of our sample, the downward
trend in aggregate volatility is diﬃcult to observe.12 Figure 9 represents the average volatility of
the growth rate of real sales for the two digit sectors in the US economy.13
To conduct the variance decomposition, the following notation is introduced. Let γXt be the
growth rate of aggregate real sales in our sample deﬂated using the aggregate PPI, γxit be the
growth rate of real sales for ﬁrm i and sit be the share of sales for ﬁrm i in the total sales for our
12On average, the sales of the ﬁrms in our COMPUSTAT sample represents 78 percent of GDP. Since the materials
and energy share is approximately 50 percent of gross output, this means that the compustat sample represents about
39 percent of the economic activity in the US.
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Figure 9: Average Variance of the Growth rate of Real Sales for 2-digit sectors.
12sample, all in year t. Also, let V ([Zτ]
t+5
t−4) denote the variance of {Zt−4,Z t−3, ... Zt,...Z t+4,Z t+5}




t−4) be the covariance between {Zt−4,Z t−3, ... Zt,...


























For simplicity, suppose that sit = si for all the ﬁrms i and all years t. Then, V ([γXt]
t+5
















































































































Hence, the variance of the growth rate of aggregate sales is decomposed into two terms - the
ﬁrst is related to the ﬁrm level variance of sales (variance component) and the second reﬂects the
covariances between the growth rates of sales at diﬀerent ﬁrms (covariance component).14 Figure
10 shows the evolution of these terms since 1950. There are two important remarks. First, the
evolution of the volatility of the aggregate growth rate of sales in our COMPUSTAT sample is
e n t i r e l yd r i v e nb yt h ec o v a r i a n c et e r m . T h ev a r i a n c et e r mi sa no r d e ro fm a g n i t u d es m a l l e ra n d
has no signiﬁcant impact on aggregate volatility. In other words, to understand the evolution of
14The small discrepancy between the total variance and the sum of these two components is due to the time
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Figure 10: Variance Covariance Decomposition of Aggregate Growth Rate of COMPUSTAT Sales
aggregate volatility, we need to understand the forces that drive the covariance of sales growth
between ﬁr m sa so p p o s e dt ow h a ta ﬀects the volatility of ﬁrm sales. Second, the decline in the
variance component is entirely driven by the decline in the sum of squared shares (
P
i s2
i)w h i c hi s
in turn due to the dramatic increase in the number of ﬁrms in our sample.
4 Volatility over the cycle
Finally, to conclude the empirical investigation, an issue of independent interest is examined:
namely, the pro-ciclicality of volatility. To address this question, we follow Comin and Gertler
[2003] by ﬁltering non-farm business output and the various series of volatility using a band pass
ﬁlter that removes frequencies lower than 50 years. This ﬁlter generates 6 cycles in the US post-war
period. Such a ﬁlter is employed in favor of more standard (higher-frequency) ﬁl t e r ss u c ha st h e
Hodrik-Prescott since movements at medium term frequencies are larger in comparison to move-
ments at higher frequencies and are, in all likelihood, connected to the high-frequency ﬂuctuations.15
We then compute the cross-correlogram between out p u ta n dw e i g h t e da n du n - w e i g h t e dm e a s u r e so f
ﬁrm and aggregate-level volatility. Figure 11 displays the cross-correlograms. Two observations are
made. First, volatility (both aggregate and ﬁrm-level) seems procyclical. Second, the primary dif-
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Figure 11: Cross-correlogram of ﬁltered Non-Farm Business Output Output and Filtered Aggregate
and Fim-level Volatility.
ference in terms of cyclical patterns is that, following a boom, ﬁrm-level volatility increases almost
immediately while aggregate volatility increases with a lag. Speciﬁcally, the maximum response pe-
riod is ﬁve to six years for aggregate volatility, three to four years for weighted ﬁrm-level volatility
a n dl e s st h a nay e a rf o ru n - w e i g h t e dﬁrm-level volatility.
5 Conclusions
The U.S. economy has experienced opposite trends in volatility at the aggregate and ﬁrm level. At
the aggregate level, several variables have become less volatile, with an interruption of this trend
during the 70’s and early 80’s. At the micro level, however, the volatility of these very variables
exhibits an upward trend. We believe the symmetric nature of these diverging trends (Figure 7)
makes a common explanation (or set of explanations) likely.
Importantly, the upward trend in micro volatility has interesting implications when evaluating
the proposed explanations for the decline in aggregate volatility. McConnell and Perez-Quiros [2000]
proposed that new inventory management methods, such as just-in-time inventory management, are
the source of the reduction in volatility in GDP. This mechanism operates at the ﬁrm level and,
therefore implies that the volatility of output at the ﬁrm level should decline as well. This hypothesis
15is inconsistent with the evidence presented in this paper. 16
A n o t h e rl i n eo fr e s e a r c ha r g u e st h a tp a r to ft h edecline in aggregate volatility is due to a more
eﬀective monetary policy that helps stabilize shocks that hit the US economy. (Boivin and Gianonni
[2002], Clarida, Gali and Gertler [2000], Congley and Sargent [2001], Gali, Lopez-Salido and Valles
[2002], Primiceri [2002] and Sims and Zha [2002]). This argument has two drawbacks. First, from
a quantitative perspective, an increase in the eﬀectiveness of monetary policy can account for, at
most, 30 percent of the reduction in aggregate volatility according to Stock and Watson [2002].17
Second, it is diﬃcult to ﬁnd mechanisms that link a more active monetary policy to the increase
in ﬁrm-level volatility. This hypothesis, thus, leaves un-explained the opposite trends observed in
aggregate and ﬁrm-level volatility.
Since we have reasons to believe that the two symmetric trends are related,18 we devote the last
paragraphs of the paper to present a brief sketch of a new explanation for the decline in aggregate
volatility, one that simultaneously explains the increase in ﬁrm level volatility.19
To motivate our explanation, it is relevant to know some additional facts. First, the upward
trend observed for the volatility of ﬁr m - l e v e ls a l e sa l s oh o l d sf o rs a l e sp e rw o r k e ra n dt h eg r o w t h
rate of ﬁrm-level employment. Similarly, the decline in volatility of aggregate output is also true of
aggregate productivity growth and aggregate employment growth. In our view, this means that the
volatility of productivity is of primary importance. To explain the divergence in the evolution of the
volatility of productivity growth at the ﬁrm and aggregate level, we build a model of endogenous
productivity growth. In our model, productivity grows because there are two types of innovations.
Embodied innovations are patentable innovations a la Aghion and Howitt [1992]. These research
eﬀorts lead ﬁrms to develop new versions of existing products or new products that replace the
current market leaders. Such improvements in productivity lead to substantial ﬁrm-level volatility
since incumbents incur losses while entrants enjoy capital gains. However, at the aggregate level,
16McConnell and Perez-Quiros [2000] stress as evidence in favor of their hypothesis the fact that there has been
a larger decline in the volatility of the quarterly growth rate in manufacturing output than the volatility of the
quarterly growth rate of manufacturing sales. However, at the annual frequency, Stock and Watson [2002] ﬁnd that
the decline in the volatilities of aggregate sales and output have been about the same for all production sectors:
durables, nondurables, services, and structures.
17Stock and Watson analyze the volatility of quarterly growth. Surely, the role of a more active monetary policy
in the reduction of volatility will be smaller when examining annual data.
18Comin and Philippon [2005] discusses in more detail these reasons.
19Comin and Mulani [2004] develops the model that underlies this explanation, provides some evidence and cali-
brates its quantitative importance.
16the eﬀects of R&D investments on volatility are relatively minor since individual gains and losses
negate each other.20
To explain the movements in aggregate volatility, it is necessary to consider a second type of
innovations. We denote these as disembodied innovations. Disembodied innovations satisfy two
properties. First, they symmetrically aﬀect both the ﬁrm that develops them as well as the rest of
the ﬁrms. Second, a ﬁrm that develops a disembodied innovation (by and large) cannot appropriate
the beneﬁts enjoyed by the other ﬁrms when adopting it. This is because disembodied innovations
such as the mass production system, new personnel and accounting practices, the use of electricity
as the source of energy in a plant,... are hard to patent and easy to reverse-engineer.
These two properties are responsible for the interesting implications of our model. The fact that
a disembodied innovation symmetrically aﬀects all ﬁrms implies that it will have a large aggregate
eﬀect. Therefore, investments in the development of disembodied innovations may lead to substan-
tial volatility in aggregate productivity growth. The fact that innovators cannot appropriate the
social value of disembodied innovations implies that their incentives to develop them are increasing
in the value of the ﬁrm. A small non-convexity in the costs of conducting disembodied innovations
c a ni m p l yt h a t ,i ne q u i l i b r i u m ,o n l yl a r g eﬁrms, which are the market leaders, invest in developing
disembodied innovations.
Interestingly, the model predicts that there is a negative relationship between the aggregate
investments in embodied and in disembodied innovations. This follows from: i) the value of market
leaders is higher when the expected duration of their market leadership is longer; ii) market turnover
is increasing in the investments in embodied innovations iii) for a market leader, the return from
investing in a disembodied innovation is increasing in the value of its company..Hence, a force that
leads the economy to invest more in developing embodied innovations may induce a decline in
disembodied investments. In terms of volatility, one such shock can simultaneously induce a decline
in aggregate volatility and an increase in ﬁrm-level volatility.
20Other investments in improving the sales of the company such as marketing and advertising expenses play a
similar role to investments in the development of embodied innovations in this framework.
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18Table 1: Average Firm-Level Volatility by Two-Digit Sectors and Decade
Un-weighted Weighted
Sector 1950's 1960's 1970's 1980's 1990's 1950's 1960's 1970's 1980's 1990's
Agriculture 0.26 0.30 0.34 0.39 0.38 0.57 0.73 0.90 1.00 1.06
Constructio 0.25 0.21 0.22 0.23 0.19 0.35 0.36 0.39 0.40 0.37
Non-Durab 0.17 0.23 0.28 0.34 0.35 0.28 0.33 0.42 0.47 0.47
Durable Ma 0.21 0.22 0.26 0.30 0.31 0.32 0.34 0.37 0.40 0.41
Transportat 0.17 0.18 0.22 0.28 0.27 0.25 0.27 0.32 0.39 0.34
Communic 0.04 -0.01 -0.01 0.05 0.06 0.21 0.21 0.23 0.28 0.29
Utilities 0.11 0.13 0.18 0.21 0.24 0.20 0.22 0.29 0.32 0.35
Wholesale 0.14 0.19 0.22 0.27 0.30 0.17 0.19 0.22 0.25 0.30
Retail Trad 0.11 0.14 0.18 0.23 0.25 0.25 0.30 0.36 0.42 0.44
Finance and -0.04 0.01 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.34 0.51 0.63 0.60 0.61
Real Estate -0.06 0.07 0.14 0.19 0.21 0.33 0.39 0.47 0.61 0.55
Services 0.07 0.16 0.24 0.32 0.40 0.32 0.40 0.45 0.54 0.57
Public Adm -0.01 0.05 0.13 0.10 0.13 0.45 0.53 0.58 0.66 0.68
Note:
Measures shown are residual volatility after controlling for age, size and firm-specific fixed effects. 